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9Introduction
This paper seeks to unveil biopolitical di-
mensions of Russia’s increasing self-asser-
tion in Georgia, a country that has faced the 
loss of two of its regions and continues to face 
intense political pressure from the Krem-
lin. We argue that one of Russia’s strongest 
policy instruments is biopolitical, since it is 
aimed at imposing a socially conservative 
agenda of biopolitical “normalization” wide-
ly supported in Georgian society (Thornton 
and Sichinava 2015). In this context, the idea 
of empire acquires visible biopolitical con-
notations: Russia intends to reshape borders 
by expanding its version of biopolitical con-
servatism (Makarychev and Yatsyk 2015) 
and include the Georgian population, which 
shares the Orthodox values constitutive for 
Putin’s ideology, in the sphere of the Russian 
normative counter-project.
The concept of biopolitics has a rich ac-
ademic legacy, yet it also denotes a specifi c 
type of policy that distinguishes it from geo-
political strategies. In January 2016 Russian 
President Vladimir Putin explained the an-
nexation of Crimea in predominantly bio-
political – as opposed to geopolitical - terms, 
claiming that Russia is more concerned about 
people than about borders. As a policy, bio-
politics is conducive to the emergence of a 
specifi c Russian identity based largely on 
the idea of defending the threatened lives of 
people looking for protection, rather than on 
the logic of material gains through territori-
al acquisition. For Russia, territory as such is 
not necessarily at the top of its priorities – the 
Russian Army did not fully occupy Georgia 
in August 2008, and Russia is reluctant to 
fully and immediately absorb Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia (along with Donbas and Trans-
nistria). In the meantime, Russian dominance 
is, to a larger extent, based on infl uencing 
different groups of the population through 
discourses that culturally and (bio)politically 
reconnect them to the Russian collective Self.
Our argument is three-fold. First, we ap-
proach biopolitics not in a narrow technical 
sense as a set of policy tools that are meant 
to protect or control (groups of) population; 
we claim that biopolitics necessarily presup-
poses as its key strategy the social construc-
tion of a population that is never “given”. 
Through biopolitical instruments it can be 
constructed differently – as a unifi ed com-
munity supposedly sharing common nor-
mative grounding (the “Russian world”); as 
a group of internally displaced people that 
need to be taken care of (refugees in confl ict 
areas); as recipients of humanitarian assis-
tance, and so forth. These role identities are 
situational and depend on the contexts cre-
ated by different modalities of biopower. 
Second, the application of biopolitical - 
i.e. focused on controlling groups of popula-
tion - instruments strengthens imperial logic 
in Russian foreign policy. This argument can 
be explored on the grounds of the projection 
of Russian “pastoral power” to Georgia, 
with its strong conservative components 
and moral appeal, as well as on the basis of 
Moscow’s policy of gradually incorporating 
its population through passportization. 
Third, we deem that the practice of bio-
politics in the South Caucasus is a battlefi eld 
for a number of projects competing with 
each other. Being an object of Russian bio-
power, Georgia itself develops biopolitical 
approaches and thus includes them in the 
process of its identity-making. This recip-
rocal biopoliticization of Russian– Georgian 
relations creates spaces where the two actors 
either compete with each other (over loyal-
ties of the residents in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia), or fi nd themselves in a comple-
mentary position over a plethora of policy 
issues pertaining to the conservative agenda 
with its strong biopolitical elements.
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we can save ourselves only with Russia”.
But it is not necessarily that the ROC di-
rectly instructs the GOC on specifi c policy 
issues. There is no strong evidence of Geor-
gia’s high importance for the ROC, which 
does not have a well-developed and artic-
ulated policy towards Georgia, yet it is the 
GOC that explicitly or implicitly uses the 
conservative discourse emanating from the 
ROC for the sake of signifying the tradition-
al value-based core of Georgian authentic 
identity. “Presumably, what irritates the West 
is the high authority of religion in Georgia, 
which appears to contravene experiences of dem-
ocratic countries. Yet our patriarch does have a 
high authority that they (the West. – authors.) 
would like to destroy”, - this statement by 
a Georgian priest resembles the conspira-
cy theories that are also popular in Russia. 
The same goes for Eurosceptic voices in the 
Georgian religious community: “Perhaps, 
Europe has already detached itself from 
Christianity... It does not deem it essential 
any longer to fi ll your liberties with eternal 
values ... The most fundamental for Europe 
is the untouchable freedom of choice. Yet is 
there a deep wisdom in this?“.
Against this backdrop, the ROC undoubt-
edly has an essential infl uence on Georgian 
Orthodox culture, to a large extent through 
Russian language theological literature. Yet, 
as one of local priests mentioned, 
“since 1990s the situation has changed. 
When Georgian priests begun to move out of 
Georgia and the USSR, to Greece or Romania, 
we have started learning from others. Older 
priests are closer to Russian religious tradi-
tions, while their younger colleagues share 
more with the Balkan canons”.
 The specifi city of the latter is mostly re-
lated to such religious practices as frequen-
cy of Eucharist or confession, though these 
canonical differences have also contributed 
A major source of biopolitical discours-
es and practices in this fi eld is the Russian 
Orthodox Church (ROC) that, in accordance 
with Michel Foucault’s thinking, can be seen 
as a biopolitical institution of “pastoral pow-
er”. Religion must be included in the biopo-
litical sphere of taking care of human lives. 
Along the lines of Foucault’s reasoning, pas-
toral power is a power of taking care of lives 
through “modern biopolitical rationalities” 
(Hannah 2011, 230-231). As Mika Ojakangas 
(2005, 19) posits, from the times of antiquity 
states exercised power “over land, whereas 
the shepherd wields power over a fl ock… 
The task of the shepherd is to provide con-
tinuous material and spiritual welfare for 
each and every member of the fl ock”. Pas-
toral power has strong connotations with 
biopower since its object is “people on the 
move rather than ... static territory” (Golder 
2007, 165); biopower and pastoral power 
share other important characteristics – nor-
mative / spiritual components and surveil-
lance mechanisms. 
After Russia lost many forms of infl uence 
in Georgia as a result of the August war of 
2008, one of the few channels of communi-
cation that remained between the two peo-
ples was maintained by the two Orthodox 
Churches (Kornilov and Makarychev 2015). 
The accentuation of cultural and religious 
affi nity with Georgia is for Moscow a biopo-
litical instrument allowing for emphasizing 
the incompatibility of “traditional” Ortho-
dox values with the EU’s liberal, emancipa-
tory agenda, which, according to its critics, 
“calls for respecting sin” and “forgets about 
nations and patriotism” (Devdariani 2014). 
As a Georgian Orthodox priest noted,
“We have a common Orthodox spirit with 
Russia...I like the way the Russian state treats 
same-sex marriages; it is important for us here. 
When the West came to resist God, we see that 
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to the spread of European cultural values to 
the Georgian clergy in general. The shared 
Orthodox faith can also produce some am-
biguity towards Russia. Some priests with-
in the GOC are not happy to see themselves 
dependent on their Russian brothers.5
“As I see it, we don’t have such big prob-
lems with Russia as we do with the West... 
Both of them are empires that wish to control 
the world... We don’t want to be parts of either 
of the two projects... As far as Russia’s policy 
is concerned, it is rude... If Russia comes again 
with its aggressive attitudes – well, something 
that already happen can repeat... We have lost 
a lot, yet kept intact our language, faith and 
morals, which are the main values for us... 
You Russians have force and culture, we also 
have our own spirituality, and we all togeth-
er can say to the West – no, what exists with 
you will not exist here; we can take from you 
something good, but not homosexuals”.
The GOC is a diverse and fragmented ag-
glomeration of different religious platforms, 
and does not speak with a single voice on 
policy issues. Within the GOC there are 
priests who share classical theories of West-
ern conspiracy against Orthodoxy, and there 
are also those who accept the liberal values 
of human dignity and freedom. Yet both of 
them see Russia as an empire.
“Georgia does not wish to submit itself to 
Russia, since this would entail a loss of the po-
litical freedom that we have gained... A blend 
of Christianity and imperialism does not give 
us anything healthy. The spirit of Byzantium 
that could have had historical roots nowadays 
looks obsolete. Russia does have that kind of 
inclinations, which is bad... In the meantime 
I can’t say that the ROC is short of the holy 
spirit”
The GOC is thus a controversial institu-
tion: it may both support the European inte-
gration of Georgia and team up with Stalinist 
sympathizers; Ilia the Second may be critical 
of Russia’s policy in the occupied territories, 
while also meet the explicitly-pro-Kremlin 
group of the “Night Wolves” biker club, 
which is known for its neo-imperial image 
(Chinkova 2014, Kevorkova 2013). However, 
even if we take the GOC narratives that ra-
diate pro-Russian sympathies, the question 
arises: are those sympathies a product of 
Russian biopower, or do they stem from the 
ideological consonance of the two kindred 
churches? It is true that the Patriarch Ilia has 
called Putin “a wise ruler who will neces-
sarily help reunite Georgia... Russia’s idea is 
about the protection of spirituality” (Apsny 
2013). It is also true that Georgian priests 
can refer to their Russian spiritual teachers 
in public pronouncements and copy many 
practices of the ROC, but still the latter is 
overwhelmingly perceived by the Georgian 
Orthodox community as an external force 
indirectly infl uenced by the Kremlin:
“There is a presumption that people who 
propagate pro-Russian sympathies might have 
been working for Russian special services, or 
for kindred Georgian organizations for which 
religious connections are important“.
There is an undeniable potential for ROC 
infl uence in Georgia, but that hardly leads 
to direct practical implications. The head of 
the GOC has, on numerous occasions, made 
pro-Western statements, and celebrations 
of the 30st anniversary of his enthronement 
were held without representatives of the 
ROC. It is telling that GOC representatives 
try to keep a critical distance from Russian 
policies towards Ukraine. Thus, the Metro-
politan Nikolay suggested that “what hap-
pens in Ukraine is close to us: in 1993 we 
went through pretty much the same. In an 
Abkhazian village a monk, who never took 
arms in his hands, was killed just because he 
represented the GOC” (RIA 2015). By say-
ing that, the Georgian priest drew a paral-
lel between separatists in the two countries, 
and indirectly identifi ed GOC with the Ky-
iv-based Ukrainian Orthodox Church.
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Normatively, Russian religious diploma-
cy revolves around a conservative agenda 
that plays a political role: the pro-LGBT vs. 
anti-LGBT dichotomy transforms into a pro-
EU vs. pro-Russian dilemma. Thus, some 
in Georgia think that Russia manipulates 
the widely spread religious feelings and 
the veneration of Orthodox values to isolate 
Georgia from the West:
“Church in Georgia is a key identity mak-
er. It imposes two bans on those who are sup-
posed to be loyal to the idea of the nation – on 
being non-Orthodox and being LGBT… On 
May 17 2013 Orthodox priests called for join-
ing a homophobic demonstration. 40,000 peo-
ple celebrated hegemonic masculinity against 
a dozen of their LGBT opponents”.
Yet some of Georgian priests didn’t sup-
port this idea:
“The May 17 event has elucidated a stark 
difference between locally educated priests 
and those who had the experience of studying 
in Europe. Everyone was contacted by the Pa-
triarchy and invited to come to the public ac-
tion with their entire parish, but not everyone 
liked this… It’s a shame that this manifesta-
tion took place under the aegis of the GOC” .
Meanwhile, representatives of a different 
religious group were in agreement that 
“LGBT is a convenient point of consolida-
tion for the Church… Even if LGBT disap-
pears from the agenda, the Church would fi nd 
another issue – they would campaign against 
Coca-Cola, McDonald’s, etc.”.
Relations between the two Churches are 
complicated by the religious situation in 
Abkhazia, where the Orthodox clergy of 
local origin started to gain infl uence in the 
diocese only in the 1990s and welcomed the 
military success of their compatriots in the 
war of 1992-1993. By contrast, the clergy of 
Georgian origin continued to hope for a uni-
ty of all lands that are claimed as the “canon-
ical territories” of the Georgian Orthodox 
Church (Ieromonakh Dorofey 2006). Plans 
of the Abkhazian clergy to create their own 
Church with the assistance of the Moscow 
Patriarchate were supported after the war of 
2008. 
The Moscow Church has taken the prag-
matic stand of non-recognition of the inde-
pendence of the Abkhaz Orthodox Church. 
The Russian Patriarch Kirill stressed many 
times that both Abkhazia and South Osse-
tia continue to fall under the jurisdiction of 
the Georgian Orthodox Church. The ROC 
did not challenge the outcome of the Au-
gust war of 2008 but followed the principle 
of respecting the borders of the “canonical 
territories” (Venediktova 2013). In response, 
the Tbilisi Patriarchate refused to recognize 
the Autocephalous Orthodox Church of 
Ukraine, which had proclaimed its indepen-
dence from Moscow. Answering why the 
GOC has made such a decision, one of our 
experts suggested that “should we support 
any of these churches, we’ll lose the Ortho-
dox unity”.
ROC’s support for the integrity of the ca-
nonical territory of the GOC comes out of the 
fear of losing infl uence in post-Soviet coun-
tries and the interest to have the GOC on its 
side in issues that are important to the ROC 
- its property in Estonia and uneasy rela-
tions with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. 
Unlike the Kremlin, the ROC is disinterest-
ed in reconsidering the extant borders, and 
for pragmatic reasons is more interested in 
keeping relations with Georgia rather than 
with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Yet polit-
ically, the stand of the ROC has created con-
troversy, since the head of the Georgian Or-
thodox Church keeps insisting that the lost 
territories will ultimately return to Georgia 
(Rosbalt 2013). The Georgian Patriarch has 
also said that Moscow Patriarch Kirill does 
everything possible to help restore the uni-
ty of Georgia (Apsny 2013). The reaction in 
Abkhazia to this statement was predictably 
negative.
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Nevertheless, as our interviewee said,
“non-offi cially the ROC administers the 
Abkhaz diocese by sending monks and priests 
to serve in Abkhazian churches… A local fel-
low of mine admitted that these actions were 
not canonic, yet the Georgians simply close 
their eyes to it. We don’t protest and don’t 
make a case out of it since we can’t physically 
be in Abkhazia, yet our co-believers who need 
spiritual help remain there”.
The GOC itself is unhappy with some of 
the ambiguity of the ROC’s policy toward 
the two break-away territories. 
“We are very concerned about what is go-
ing on in Abkhazia. In words, the ROC rec-
ognizes it as an integral part of the Georgian 
patriarchy, yet de-facto ROC administers the 
Abkhazian Church. Churches over there are 
reshaped in closer compliance with the Rus-
sian style. This is an intentional policy of do-
ing away with traces of the Georgian Ortho-
doxy. It is impossible to hold services in the 
Georgian language there any longer. This is 
an unfriendly stance”.
Another Georgian priest shared similar 
concerns:
“Georgians are being expelled from Ab-
khazia... A few remaining priests proclaimed 
their independent parish… Their policies are 
non-canonical… It would be ideal if the ROC 
could be an intermediary between the GOC 
and the Abkhaz priests, but instead the ROC 
started taking a top-down position… GOC 
does not raise this issue, being reluctant to 
agitate anti-Russian attitudes. But emotions 
persist”.
However, high representatives of the 
GOC raised some issues internationally: 
for example, Archbishop Andrian Gvazava 
asked UNESCO to monitor churches and 
monasteries in the regions that are beyond 
the Georgian government’s control (Inter-
pressnews 2015). The Holy Synod of the 
GOC issued a statement accusing the ROC 
of converting churches built in Sukhumi and 
Tkvarcheli in September 2013 into Russian 
Orthodox Churches. As the President of In-
ternational Foundation for Unity of Ortho-
dox People Valery Alexeev explained, how-
ever, Russian Orthodox priests only attended 
the ceremonies according to the agreement 
between the ROC and GOC on the spiritu-
al nurturing of Russian soldiers located in 
Abkhazia (Prikhody  2014). Therefore, con-
troversies over separatist territories inhibit 
religious communication even though the 
two churches share a common conservative 
agenda grounded in strong practices of bio-
political regulation and control over human 
bodies. 
Conclusion
In this article we have reached three main 
conclusions. First, the application of biopo-
litical policy tools creates new forms of inclu-
sions to and exclusions from political commu-
nities-in-the-making, and thus it infl uences 
practices of border making and unmaking, the 
logic of which might not coincide with national 
jurisdictions. We have seen that biopolitical in-
struments (care and protection of human lives) 
are inseparably connected with constructing 
role identities of groups of people as related 
to protecting and taking care of their everyday 
lives. This explains the role of biopower as one 
of nodal points in Russian neo imperial project. 
Second, we have justifi ed the applica-
tion of biopolitical frame for studying vast 
areas of consonance between Russian and 
Georgian religious discourses. Apart from 
ideological affi nity we have seen that both 
parties use each other for political gain: 
the ROC is eager to project its conservative 
agenda onto Georgia for the sake of expand-
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ing the Moscow-patronized community of 
Orthodox believers, while the GOC refers to 
the authority of ROC for boosting its excep-
tional role in Georgian society and politics.
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